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ABSTRACT 
 
Multisignature is an extension of digital signature, where a group of signers jointly produce a 
valid signature on a message. Distinguished Signing authorities were first introduced by 
L.Harn. In Distinguished signing authorities, each of the signers is responsible for only one 
part of the message rather than the whole message itself. Along with the group of signers, we 
also have a trusted clerk who verifies the individual signatures and generates the final 
multisignature. 
We extensively studied the two existing schemes proposed by Harn and Hwang. Although 
Hwnag’s scheme overcame all the drawbacks of Harn’s scheme, it has drawbacks like high 
computational cost and communication overhead. So, we proposed a modification over 
Hwang’s scheme taking into consideration the signature length, computational complexity of 
signature generation and the cost of signature verification. 
The performance evaluation of the proposed scheme was theoretically compared to that of the 
Hwang’s scheme. Both the schemes are implemented to calculate the signature length and the 
execution time required for different phases in the multisignature scheme. Hence these 
implementation results were useful to verify the performance evaluation.  
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1. OBJECTIVE 
 
To design a new multisignature scheme with distinguished signing authorities based upon 
computationally hard assumption like discrete logarithmic problem (DLP).  Our scheme will 
mainly focus on the following features: 
i. Basic security criteria of Multisignature scheme 
ii. Signature Length must be minimum 
iii. Cost of signature generation and verification must be low. 
iv. Less communicational overhead. 
The focus of our research is on features such as signature length, execution time and 
communication costs as compared to existing schemes. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Digital signature schemes help us to validate the authenticity of a message using the signer’s 
public key. Only the signer can produce a valid signature using his private key. Multisignature 
is a special kind of digital signature scheme in which a group of signers can jointly produce a 
compact signature on a message. Such a system has many potential uses, for example – 
Contract signing, Co-signing of a document, etc. There may be situations in which the message 
can be divided into different parts and each signer is responsible only for a part of the message. 
In such scenarios, we can use multisignature scheme with distinguished signing authorities. 
 
Multisignature schemes with distinguished signing authorities were first proposed by Harn in 
based on the discrete logarithmic problem [1]. In Harn’s scheme, no evidence can be used to 
prove the signers distinguished authority. The reason is that, all individual signatures and 
multisignatures are generated on the same hash digest of all the partial contents. Moreover, Li 
et al.’s also showed that this scheme is not secure against their attack in [2]. Any insider using 
this attack, can produce a valid group signature for any message. Later, Hwang was able to 
overcome the above two problems in [3]. However, Hwang’s scheme involves high 
computational cost and large number of data transmission. 
 
In this thesis, we propose a novel multisignature scheme with distinguished signing authorities 
based upon DLP which is improvement over Hwang’s scheme. The main modifications done 
are communication between the group of signers and the clerk, the role of the clerk and the 
calculation of commitment value and individual signatures during the multisignature 
generation phase. 
 
 
3 
 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 3, we discussed the literature covering all the 
significant research in this area. The proposed multisignature scheme is discussed in Chapter 
4. The implementation details of the above scheme are given in Chapter 5. The results and 
observations are analysed in Chapter 6. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER – 3 
(LITERATURE SURVEY) 
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3. LITERATURE SURVEY 
3.1 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of writing in secret codes. It mainly involves two processes – 
encryption and decryption. The ordinary text is called plain text while the plain text after 
encryption is called cipher text. Encryption is the process of converting plain text into cipher 
text using a secret key. Decryption is the reverse of encryption. Modern day cryptography uses 
these three distinct techniques – Symmetric key cryptography, Asymmetric key cryptography 
and Hashing given in [7, 8]. 
3.1.1 Symmetric key cryptography: 
In symmetric key cryptography, both the encryption and decryption use the same secret key. A 
single secret key is shared by both the sender and the receiver .The sender sends the plain text 
by converting the plain text into cipher text using the secret key. The receiver after receiving 
the cipher text uses the same secret key for decryption. 
3.1.2 Asymmetric key cryptography: 
In asymmetric key cryptography, we have two types of keys – public key and private key. To 
send a message, the sender uses the public key of the receiver to encrypt the plain text. Then 
the receiver uses his secret key to decipher the message. 
3.1.3 Hashing: 
In hashing, a fixed-length message digest is created out of a variable length message using a 
cryptographic hash function. These are mainly used in digital signature schemes. Hashing helps 
in providing check values for message integrity.   
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3.2 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is used for finding the authenticity and validity of documents or messages. It 
consists of two mechanisms – signing and verification. The signer calculates the signature 
based on the message/document using his private key. While the verification can be done by 
anyone using the public key of the signer. Generally the signature is generated on the message 
digest created using one way cryptographic hash functions like SHA -1. Elgamal proposed a 
digital signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem in [4]. 
 
 
FIGURE – 1: Digital Signature scheme 
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The digital signature schemes are based upon computationally hard problems like discrete 
logarithmic problem (DLP), Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDHA), Integer 
factorization problem (IFP) etc. 
Depending on the extra features that can be incorporated into digital signature schemes, they 
are divided into different categories like: 
i. Proxy signature  
ii. Blind signature 
iii. Ring signature 
iv. Group signature 
v. Multisignature 
 
3.2.1 Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP): 
Discrete logarithms are logarithms defined with regard to multiplicative cyclic groups as 
explained in [10, 16]. If G is a multiplicative cyclic group and g is a generator of G, then from 
the definition of cyclic groups, we know every element h in G can be written as gx for some x. 
The discrete logarithm to the base g of h in the group G is defined to be x.  
For example, consider group – Z5*, 
The generator is 2. 
Discrete logarithm of 1 is 4.   (24 ≡ 1 mod 5) 
The discrete logarithm problem is defined as:  
Given a group G, a generator g of the group and an element h of G, to find the discrete logarithm 
to the base g of h in the group G. 
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3.2.2 Elgamal Digital Signature based on DLP: 
Here we will discuss a basic digital signature based on DLP proposed by Elgamal in [4]. 
Let p be a large prime number, g be the primitive element, y public key and m be the document 
to be signed. The signer uses his secret key in order to produce a valid signature s on the given 
message m. Any outsider should be able to verify the validity of the signature using the public 
key y of the signer. 
 
Signing procedure: 
i. Choose a random number k between 0 and p-1 such that gcd(k,p-1) = 1 
ii. Compute r = gk  mod p 
iii. S can be found out by solving the equation  m = xr + ks mod(p-1) 
 
Verification Procedure: 
p, m, r, s, y, g are made public.  
By substituting the signature (r, s) along with these values in gm = yrrs mod p, we can find out 
the authenticity of the digital signature and the message pair. 
 
Usage of DLP in above scheme: 
Here, we have made g, p and y public. If an attacker tries to find out the secret key of the signer, 
he has to solve  y = gx mod p. Finding x is a hard problem based on discrete logarithm. Hence 
securing the public key and prevents any attacker to find the secret key from it. 
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3.3 Multisignature scheme 
 
3.3.1 Steps involved in a multisignature scheme: 
Formally a multisignature scheme consists of four algorithms – Setup, Key generation, 
Signature generation and Signature verification as described in [11]. 
i. Setup :  
Parameters – Setup (1k) 
A central authority, on input of the security parameter K, runs the algorithm setup to 
produce global information parameters. Algorithm setup is probabilistic. 
ii. Key Generation: 
(SK, PK) - Key generation 
It is executed by each signer on input parameters, generate their respective secret key 
(SK) and public key (PK). This algorithm is also probabilistic. 
iii. Signature Generation: 
The signing algorithm must be a probabilistic algorithm which, given a message m, the 
global information parameters, and a list of signers L along with their public and secret 
keys produce a multisignature S. The multisignature can be interactive or non-
interactive. 
iv. Signature Verification: 
{0, 1} – Verify (parameters, m, L, S) verifies if S is a valid signature on the given 
message m with respect to L. This algorithm is deterministic. 
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3.3.2 Distinguished Signing authorities: 
The concept of distinguished signing authorities arises when the signers who are generating 
the multisignature are responsible only for a part of the whole message. It is more useful when 
the signers don’t need to sign the whole message. Let us understand this using an example 
similar to the one given in [1]. 
An institute has a document consisting of physics, chemistry and maths sections. Each signer 
is responsible for verifying and signing the respective section belonging to the signer. The 
signer of maths section doesn’t need the knowledge of other two sections while signing. But 
the whole document is required which consists of all the sections. Anyone should be able to 
verify the authenticity and integrity of the document using the signature. For the sake of 
confidentiality, some verifiers may be restricted to access and verify only some sections of the 
document. 
In the above case, multisignature schemes with distinguished signing authorities is required for 
efficient calculation of the signatures and have better confidentiality. 
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3.4 Analysis of Existing Schemes 
 
3.4.1 Harn’s multisignature scheme: 
The concept of distinguished signing authorities was first proposed by Harn in [4]. He listed 
the properties associated with undistinguished and distinguished authorities.  
Multisignature schemes with undistinguished signing authorities: 
i. Multisignatures are generated by multiple group members with the knowledge of 
multiple private keys 
ii. They can be verified easily by using the group public key without knowing each signer's 
public key 
iii. It is computationally infeasible to generate the group signature without the co-operation 
of all group members. 
Additional properties for distinguished signing authorities: 
i. Each member has distinguished signing authority 
ii. Partial content can be verified without revealing the whole document. 
Drawbacks of Harn’s schemes: 
i. No evidence can be used to distinguish the signing authorities. The reason is that, all 
individual signatures and multisignatures are generated on the same hash digest of the 
hash digests of all the partial contents.  
ii. Z.C.Li showed that this scheme is not secure against their attack in [2]. Any insider 
using this attack, can produce a valid group signature for any message. 
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3.4.2 Hwang’s multisignature scheme: 
Hwang was able to overcome all the drawbacks that were present in Harn’s multisignature 
schemes in [3], in the following ways: 
i. To overcome the insider forgery attack proposed in [2], the group’s public key 
generation has been modified to use exponential operation instead of multiplications. 
ii. A new step is included in the scheme called Evidence verification which helps us to 
distinguish the signing authorities. Now, signers can prove their ownership of their 
respective signatures and message pairs. 
The following are the drawbacks we found out in Hwnag’s scheme: 
i. The multisignature generation phase requires lot of unnecessary data transmissions 
which lead to high communication overhead. 
ii. Since, setup is run only a few times, the significant computational cost to be considered 
is during the signature generation and evidence verification phase. The computational 
complexity is high in case of the multisignature generation phase. 
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(PROPOSED MULTISINGATURE SCHEME) 
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4. PROPOSED MULTISIGNATURE SCHEME 
4.1 Modification over Hwnag’s scheme 
The following are the major changes made in the existing Hwang’s signature in order to 
propose our new scheme: 
1. Role of the trusted clerk. 
2. Communication between the signers and the clerk 
3. Calculation of commitment value and individual signatures during the 
multisignature generation phase. 
4.2 Proposed Multisignature scheme 
Let the group of signers be {U1, U2, U3… Un} and the message be M = {m1, m2, m3… mn}. Ui 
is responsible for signing the partial content mi for i=1, 2…n. A trusted clerk chooses a large 
prime p, a prime divisor q such that q | (p-1) and a one way hash function – h. 
STEP -1 (Key generation): 
Each signer selects a secret key xi such that 1<xi<q. xi is known only to Ui (secret key). Each 
signer Ui publishes their public key 𝑦𝑖 = Ɑ
𝑥𝑖   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). Ɑ is the generator of cyclic group of 
order q Є Zp*. After everyone publishes their public key, clerk calculates group public 
key 𝑌 =  ∏ 𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
STEP - 2 (Multisignature generation phase): 
i. Each signer Ui selects a random number ki Є Zq* and computes 𝑟𝑖 = Ɑ
𝑘i  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
He also computes the message digest using the hash function – h. Then each signer 
transmits (ri, h (mi)) to the clerk. 
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ii. Then the clerk calculates, the commitment value, R = ∏   𝑟i
(ℎ(𝑚𝑖))𝑛
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) and 
the message digest of whole message m’ = h( h(m1), h(m2), …h(mn),R)  and sends 
( R and m’ ) to every signer. 
iii. Each signer then computes their signatures 𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑚
′ + 𝑅𝑘𝑖ℎ(𝑚𝑖) )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) 
and send them to clerk. 
iv. Once the clerk receives all the signatures from the signers, he checks the 
authenticity of the individual signatures using the equation, Ɑ𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖
𝑚′𝑦𝑖 ∗
𝑟𝑖
𝑅ℎ(𝑚𝑖) )(𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑝).  
v. If all the signatures are valid, then the clerk generates the multisignature, S =
(∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). The multisignature for the message M is (R, S). 
STEP - 3 (Multisignature Verification): 
Check if the multisignature, (R, S) satisfies the equation, Ɑ𝑆 = (𝑌𝑚
′
∗ 𝑅𝑅)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). If it 
satisfies then the multisignature is valid and legit. Partial content can also be given like 
h(m1)||h(m2)||…||mi||…||h(mn) instead of giving the all the parts of the message - 
m1||m2||…||mi||…||mn . 
STEP - 4 (Evidence Verification): 
All individual signature (ri, si) can be used as evidence to show that Ui is responsible for signing 
the part of the message – mi. If (ri, si) satisfy the equation, Ɑ
𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖
𝑚′𝑦𝑖  ∗  𝑟𝑖
𝑅ℎ(𝑚𝑖))(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
then evidence for Ui and mi can be verified. 
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5. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
5.1 Details regarding implementation 
 Language used : JAVA ( DSA parameters, Big Integer class) 
 Hash function : SHA -1 (creates 160-bit hash value) 
 No. of signers considered are 2-10 
 No. of bits used for p : 512 -1024 ( only multiples of 64 ) 
 No. of bits used for q : 160 
 Permanent/Intermediate data is stored in CSV files 
 Messages to be signed are present in a folder – “messages” 
 4 modules present – Setup, Generation, Verification, Evidence 
5.2 Modules 
5.2.1 Setup: 
This module is responsible for the following: 
i. Initialising the domain parameters –  
p – Large prime number 
q – Large prime number [q| (p-1)] 
g – Generator 
bl – Bit length  
n – Number of signers 
ii. Initialising the public and private keys for the n signers. 
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Input: No. of signers, Bit Length 
Output: 3 CSV files  
i. parameter.csv – p, q, g, bl, n 
ii. privatekey.csv – private keys of all the signers ( x
i
 ) 
iii. publickey.csv – public keys of all the signers and the group public key ( y
i
 and Y) 
  𝑦𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑥𝑖   (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 𝑌 =  ∏ 𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
 
5.2.2 Generation: 
This module is responsible for the following: 
i. Obtain domain parameters from “parameter.csv” file. 
ii. Obtain key pairs (x
i
,y
i
) from “privatekey.csv”, “publickey.csv” files respectively. 
iii. Calculation of hash values of m
i
 and M’. 
iv. Storing the values of individual hash values - h(m
i
) in “hash.csv” file. 
v. Individual commitment values – r
i
 are calculated and stored in “commitment.cvs” 
file. Total commitment value – R is formulated from h(mi) and ri. 
vi. Y, R, M’ are stored in “output.csv” file. 
 
    𝑟𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑘
i  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
     R = ∏   𝑟
i
(ℎ(𝑚𝑖
))𝑛
𝑖=1  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 
M’ = h( h(m
1
), h(m
2
), ………..h(m
n
), R) 
  
vii. Using values y
i
, x
i
, M’, k
i
, h(m
i
), we calculate individual signatures – s
i
 
𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑚
′ + 𝑅𝑘𝑖ℎ(𝑚𝑖) )   𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 
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viii. Verification of individual signature authenticity. 
        𝑔𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖
𝑚′𝑦𝑖 ∗  𝑟𝑖
𝑅ℎ(𝑚𝑖) )  𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑝 
After verifying, store s
i
 in “signature.csv” file. 
ix. Calculation of the final multisignature S and append it to the file “output.csv”. 
S = (∑ 𝑠𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
)  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 
 
Input: 
i. 3 CSV files generated in step-1 – parameter.csv, publickey.csv, privatekey.csv 
ii. Set of message stored in the folder – “messages” 
Output:  
i. 4 CSV files - hash.csv, commitment.csv, signature.csv, output.csv 
ii. Final multisignature – S 
 
5.2.3 Verification: 
This module is responsible for the following: 
i. Obtain domain parameters from “parameter.csv” file 
ii. S, M’, R, Y are obtained from “output.csv” file. 
iii. Check the authenticity of the multisignature using    𝑔𝑆 = (𝑌𝑀
′
 ∗  𝑅𝑅  ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑝 
Input: 2 CSV files – parameter.csv, output.csv. 
Output:  
i. Validity and authenticity of the multisignature. 
ii. Final multisignature – (R,S) and its length.  
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5.2.4 Evidence: 
This module is responsible for the following: 
i. Obtain domain parameters from “parameter.csv” file 
ii. M’, R are obtained from “output.csv” file. 
iii. yi, si, h(mi), ri are obtained from the CSV files – publickey.csv, signature.csv, 
hash.csv and commitment.csv respectively. 
iv. Check validity and authenticity of individual signatures using the following formula 
𝑔𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖𝑚
′𝑦𝑖  ∗  𝑟𝑖𝑅ℎ(𝑚𝑖) ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑝 
 
 Input:  
i. 6 CSV files – parameter.csv, output.csv, publickey.csv, signature.csv, hash.csv and 
commitment.csv 
ii. Number of the user for (ri,si) and hash of the message – h(mj) 
 
Output: Validity and authenticity of the individual signatures. 
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5.3 Screen shots 
5.3.1 Setup phase: 
 
 
FIGURE - 2: Output of Setup phase 
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5.3.2 Signature Generation phase: 
 
 
FIGURE - 3: Output of Generation phase_1 
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FIGURE - 4: Output of Generation phase_2 
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5.3.3 Signature Verification phase: 
 
 
FIGURE - 5: Output of Verification phase 
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CHAPTER – 6 
(RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS) 
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6. RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
6.1 Security Analysis 
1. The proposed scheme is not vulnerable to the Li et al.’s attack. If an insider Uk wants 
to forge a signature, he has to publish his public key, 
 𝑦′
𝑘
= 𝑦𝑘(( ∏ 𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖𝑛−1
𝑖=1  )
−1)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).  
The above problem is a very difficult problem to solve. This can’t be done in 
polynomial time. 
2. If any attacker tries to solve the following equation, 
Ɑ𝑠𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖
𝑚′𝑦𝑖  ∗  𝑟𝑖
𝑅ℎ(𝑚𝑖) )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).  
This involves solving a DLP and a one-way hash function which are hard problems. So 
finding the secret keys of the signers is not possible, so nobody can forge the individual 
signatures or the multisignature. 
 
6.2 Performance evaluation 
1. The signature length of proposed scheme = |R|+|S| ≈ |p|+|q| which is the minimal 
possible length with primes - p, q. Both the proposed scheme and the Hwang’s scheme 
have same length. 
2. The verification cost for our scheme is same as to that of the Hwang’s schemes. 
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3. Let the communication cost be measured by the total no. of transmissions during the 
multisignature generation process and the number of signers be n. 
 
TABLE – 1: Comparison of communication cost 
 
Name of the scheme 
 
 
Total number of transmission 
 
 
Proposed scheme 
 
3n 
 
 
Hwang’s scheme 
 
n2 + n 
 
 
4. Computational Cost 
Let TH denote the cost of hash function h, TE denote the cost of exponential operation 
and TM denote the cost of multiplication operation in modular arithmetic. 
 
i. Proposed scheme: 
a) Public group key generation = nTE + (n-1)TM 
b) Multisignature generation =  
{n (TE + TH)} + { (n-1)TM + TH } + { n(4TM) } + { 3n(TE + TM ) } 
= 4n TE + (8n-1) TM + (n+1) TH 
c) Multisignature verification = 3TE + TM 
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ii. Hwang’s scheme: 
a) Public group key generation = nTE + (n-1)TM 
b) Multisignature generation =  
{n (TE  + TH)} + {(n-1)TM + TH } + {n (4TM + 2TH) } + {3n(TE +  TM) } 
= (n2+4n) TE + (n
2+6n) TM + (n
2+3n) TH 
c) Multisignature verification = 3 TE + TM 
It can be observed that in public key generation and signature verification phase, the 
computational cost is equal in both the schemes. They only differ in their multisignature 
generation phase. 
TABLE – 2: Comparison of computational cost 
 
Name of the scheme 
 
 
Computational cost in Multisignature generation 
 
 
Proposed scheme 
 
 
4n TE + (8n-1) TM + (n+1) TH 
 
Hwang’s scheme 
 
 
(n2+4n) TE + (n2+6n) TM + (n2+3n) TH 
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6.3 Empirical Results 
We have implemented both our proposed scheme and Hwang’s scheme. The different criteria 
compared are Length of signature (bits) and Execution time (micro sec) for multisignature 
generation phase. 
6.3.1 Signature Length: 
 
Number of 
signers (n) 
PROPOSED SCHEME HWANG’S SCHEME 
2 670 671 
3 671 669 
4 670 669 
5 668 671 
6 667 666 
7 669 668 
8 669 671 
9 670 671 
10 668 667 
AVERAGE 669.11 669.22 
 
TABLE - 3: Signature length comparison 
Length of p = 512 bits 
Length of q = 160 bits 
|p| + |q| = 512 +160 = 672 bits 
Both the schemes have almost the same signature length and are equal to |p| + |q|. 
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6.3.2 Execution time for Multisignature Generation phase 
 
Number of 
signers 
 (n) 
Proposed scheme 
(micro seconds) 
( I ) 
Hwang’s scheme 
(micro seconds) 
( II ) 
Difference 
(micro seconds) 
( II )  - ( I ) 
2 73266 78867 5601 
3 85944 98825 12881 
4 98930 121358 22428 
5 107690 144043 36353 
6 119468 180815 61347 
7 130947 211537 80590 
8 144828 245240 100412 
9 158492 270757 112265 
10 166054 303091 137073 
 
TABLE - 4: Multisignature generation phase execution time 
 It is evident from the table that the execution time for generation phase is directly 
proportional to the number of signers. 
 In every case, the execution time for the proposed scheme is always less than that of the 
existing scheme – Hwang’s scheme. 
 The difference between the execution time of the schemes increases notably when there are 
more number of signers. 
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CHAPTER – 7 
(FUTURE SCOPE AND CONCLUSION) 
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7.1 FUTURE SCOPE 
The Setup phase uses exponential operations in order to avoid the insider attack shown by Li 
et al.’s in [2]. We can try to reduce this computational cost by using less costly operation like 
multiplication. 
We studied only the basic attacks possible. So, further possible attacks can be tested and 
improvements can be suggested to increase the security of the proposed scheme. 
 
7.2 CONCLUSION 
The proposed scheme has all the basic requirements of a multisignature scheme with 
distinguished signing authorities listed in [1]. Since the setup phase in Hwang’s schemes in [3] 
is same as that of the proposed scheme, it is resistant to insider attack shown by Li et al.’s in 
[2]. Our scheme is based on a computationally hard assumption, i.e. Discrete Logarithmic 
Problem which makes it secure. 
The length of the signature, public key generation and verification cost are same for the 
proposed scheme and Hwang’s scheme. But, the communication cost and the multisignature 
generation cost has been drastically reduced in the proposed scheme when compared to 
Hwang’s scheme. These have been substantiated by observation and results obtained upon 
implementing both schemes. 
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